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Abstract 
This paper links the radical institutionalist approaches of Tool and Dugger with the 
strategic choice perspective to better understand the linkages between freedom, 
knowledge and participation in the context of a global economy dominated by 
transnational firms. A concern by economists with ‘negative’ freedom has been 
challenged by a renewed interest in the ‘positive’ dimension: drawing on Sen’s pioneering 
work on capabilities.  We argue that over-emphasis on either type of freedom could lead 
to strategic failure. Economic freedom thus constitutes consideration of what type(s) of 
freedom are emphasised, where freedom resides within the system, and how freedoms 
are realised. Public policy responses are then seen as appropriate in a globalising 
economy dominated by negatively-free strategic decision makers within transnational 
firms, tackling both the nature of the firm itself as well as the environment within which 
such decisions are made. This would constrain negative freedom for some so as to 
expand freedoms for others; enabling a more democratic form of globalisation to better 
serve the interests of a wider set of actors. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
“Globalization today is not working.  It is not working for many of the world’s poor. It is not 
working for much of the environment.  It is not working for the stability of the global 
environment” (Joseph Stiglitz, 2002) 
 
“Development can be seen… as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people 
enjoy” (Amartya Sen, 1999) 
 
The forces of globalisation are much acclaimed by governments, multinational 
organisations and the media alike (Hertz, 2001).  In a heated debate over the nature 
and significance of globalisation, one view is that government appears to be in retreat 
and that the ‘free’ market is ascendant (Falk, 1996). Transnational corporations in 
particular have successfully met threats such as the proposed UN Code of Conduct 
and are pressing for their ultimate objective at the WTO; a multinational agreement on 
investment that would give them virtually complete freedom from controls (‘negative’ 
freedom) over investment decisions (Bailey et al, 2000; Singh, 2005). This has not 
gone unchallenged; for example Falk (1996) asks how the state can be more receptive 
to “people-driven globalism”
1
, a view that stresses the role of participatory democracy 
in rethinking citizenship under globalisation.   
 
The argument in this paper is that citizenship, participation and democracy need to be 
reconsidered in the context of strategic decision-making within firms, given the 
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 Akin to a process that Sugden and Wilson (2005) term “democratic globalisation”.   
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particular importance of transnational firms in the current global economy, and given 
recent developments in economic thinking, stressing again the significance of the 
‘positive’ (‘the right or ability to’) dimension of freedom.  In so doing, we extend Tool’s 
(1979; 2001) analysis of freedom as “an expanding area of genuine choice” to strategic 
decision-making within transnational firms, the dominant actors in the global economy. 
The paper therefore links the radical institutionalist approach of Tool (1979, 2001) and 
Dugger (1984, 1989) with the strategic choice perspective (Bailey et al, 2006) so as to 
better understand the linkages between freedom, knowledge and participation in the 
context of a global economy increasingly dominated by transnational firms. In doing so, 
we raise some key issues for public policy. 
 
Section 2 distinguishes between the negative and positive concepts of freedom 
identified by Berlin (1969)
2
. Section 3 examines economists’ concerns over freedom, 
stressing recent interest in positive freedom. Section 4 links this with the strategic 
choice perspective, which highlights the position of strategic decision-makers in 
transnationals who enjoy increasing negative freedom from intervention by 
governments, workers and others over strategic issues such as output and 
employment. This intensifies the risks of strategic failure occurring.  
 
Sections 5 and 6 focus on the implications of this analysis for public policy. In section 5 
we draw out some key issues, while in section 6 we discuss implications for the design 
of industrial policy. The goal suggested here is intervention to change corporate 
governance structures, make firms more accountable, and to promote alternative 
forms of internationalisaton that, taken together, would enable different community 
actors to have a democratic say in strategic decision-making and would provide them 
with the knowledge required to participate effectively in such processes. Linking this 
with the strategic choice perspective, ‘social efficiency’ would increase as economic 
democracy is broadened and strategic failure under globalisation is avoided.   
 
2.  Dimensions of Freedom 
In his celebrated essay on liberty, Berlin distinguishes between negative and positive 
concepts of freedom (Berlin, 1969). The former concerns freedom from or the absence 
of “deliberate interference of other human beings (or agencies) within the area in which 
(one) could otherwise act” (ibid).  Thus it is concerned with the absence of constraints 
imposed by others, and ultimately concerns choice amongst alternatives or options that 
are  unimpeded by others (Gray, 1995). This emphasis on choice was particularly 
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important for Berlin, who saw the restriction of choice amongst alternatives as the 
greatest danger to freedom.  Positive freedom, in contrast, concerns the right to, the 
ability “to be a somebody, not a nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-
directed... conceiving goals and policies on (one’s) own and realising them” (Berlin, 
1969). This positive concept therefore concerns the freedom of self-mastery, of control 
of one’s own life, of the ability or power to act.  In stressing that in market economies 
the biggest impediment to freedom is poverty, Galbraith (1996) implies the positive 
dimension; the freedom to participate in the economy and society via access to 
education, health care and the legal system.
3
 
 
Whilst stressing the validity of both types of freedom, arguing that “positive and 
negative liberty are both perfectly valid concepts” and that “positive liberty... is 
essential to a decent existence” (1969), Berlin argued strongly against distortions of 
the latter, and took much more space in his critique of positive freedom than his 
argument for the negative. Indeed, Berlin argued that the two concepts historically 
“developed in divergent directions…, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with 
each other” (1969). The main argument was historical; Berlin saw negative freedom as 
less often perverted into a justification for authority than the positive concept. Galipeau 
(1994) suggests that the times set the focus: “Berlin was arguing to protect a liberal 
conception of freedom, which he dubs ‘negative liberty’, against contemporary 
[communist/Marxist] thought”. Such distortions, Berlin argued, come when the positive 
concept is transformed from a concept of individual self-mastery to one of harmonious 
collective self-direction. With enough manipulation, “freedom can be made to mean 
whatever the manipulator wishes” (Berlin, 1969).  Berlin therefore favoured negative 
freedom as he viewed it as preserving choice, whereas he saw positive freedom as 
easily distorted in ways fatal to choice (Gray, 1995).  Much later, however, Berlin 
recognised that he “ought to have made it clear that positive liberty is as noble an ideal 
as negative liberty” and that he “ought to have made more of the horrors of negative 
liberty and what that has led to” (Prospect, 1997). 
 
3.  What is ‘Economic Freedom’? 
Interestingly, Berlin was largely quiet on ‘economic freedom’, seeing the lack of 
economic power (meaning purchasing power) as the absence of the conditions of 
freedom, not the absence of freedom itself (Galipeau, 1994) and has been criticised as 
such for being too restrictive (Macpherson, 1973).  However, he did assert that natural 
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rights to liberty are distinct from supporting any particular economic arrangement and 
that both capitalist and socialist societies can violate rights (Galipeau, 1994). 
 
Once we recognise different dimensions of freedom, the dominance of negative 
freedom in contemporary economic analysis becomes apparent.  Indeed, the 
justification by economists for an exclusive reliance on market allocations has usually 
been based on an appeal to negative freedom, with market transactions being seen as 
an expression of negative freedom (Dasgupta, 1986).  A competitive market for all 
commodities is then seen as efficient in the Pareto sense.  Traditionally economists 
have stressed the centrality of negative freedom in the market mechanism (e.g., 
Hayek, 1960; Nozick, 1974; Bauer, 1984; Holmes et al., 1998). Buchanan (1986), for 
instance, rejects outright positive economic freedom: “an individual is at liberty or free 
to carry on an activity if he or she is not coerced from doing so by someone else….. 
Whether or not the individual has the ability or power to undertake the activity that he is 
at liberty to undertake is a separate matter”.  
 
More recently, though, economists have begun to explore positive freedom and its 
implications for economic development.  Amartya Sen has contributed to “a paradigm 
shift” in development economics towards an increased emphasis on individual 
entitlements, capabilities, freedoms and rights (ODI, 2001).  In so doing, Sen has 
rejected negative definitions of freedoms, shifting attention away from the absence of 
coercion as the exclusive requirement for freedom, onto the elements of what an 
individual can do or be (ibid).  Indeed, his concept of capabilities (1985, 1985a and 
1999) is defined as “notions of freedom, in the positive sense; what real opportunities 
you have regarding the life you lead”.  Moreover, ‘substantive freedom’ is viewed by 
Sen as embodying not just the freedom to satisfy hunger or to access health care or 
educational facilities, but also “the freedom to participate in the social, political and 
economic life of the community” (Sen, 1999).  Furthermore, Sen (1999) emphasises 
the process and opportunity aspects of freedom; 
 
“Such processes as participation in political decisions and social choice cannot be seen 
as being - at best – among the means to development (through, say, their contribution to 
economic growth), but have to be understood as constituent parts of the end of 
development in themselves”. 
 
“In pursuing the view of development as freedom, we have to examine… the extent to 
which people have the opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason 
to value”. 
 
From a very different perspective, that of the Austrian School, Hindmoor (1999) asks 
whether a lack of resources, as well as threatening an individual’s freedom, might 
constitute a ‘positive barrier’ to entry.  In contrast to Hayek’s (1960) negative freedom 
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approach where the presence of something, i.e. coercion, makes one unfree, 
Hindmoor argues that the absence of something – i.e. resources – can also render one 
unfree.  In this approach, entrepreneurs with no track-record and who lack resources 
to provide security will be discriminated against by lenders.  Such entrepreneurs 
remain negatively free to enter a market, but in reality remain unable to do so as they 
face a ‘positive barrier’ to entry.  Hindmoor thus argues that for the market process to 
work, governments need to intervene not only to set basic rules of the game but also to 
“ensure that participants have sufficient resources to play the game”.   
 
Again, from the very different strategic choice perspective, Cowling and Sugden (1998) 
have questioned what constitutes ‘free’ trade. They recognise “that the adjective ‘free’ 
is far from neutral and carries important connotations… to argue against ‘free trade’ is 
apparently to argue against freedom, in some sense… but what is really ‘free’ about 
free trade?”  They argue that a firm engaging in trade does so in ways designed to 
serve its strategic decision-makers, where “the ‘free’ in free trade refers to the freedom 
of strategic decision-makers in transnational corporations to further their own ends”.  In 
this sense, free trade confers freedoms on some (elite decision-makers in 
transnational firms) but “endorses that freedom being pursued despite the objections 
that might be raised by others.  Perhaps an argument against free trade is thus an 
argument for the freedom of these others?”  In so doing, Cowling and Sugden in 
essence raise a positive dimension of freedom, i.e. the ability of ‘others’ (i.e. other 
stakeholders) to contribute to strategic decision-making. 
 
Finally, Tool (1979 and 2001), in developing a “normative theory of political economy” 
from a neo-institutional perspective, sees freedom both individually and socially as an 
expanding area of genuine choice. Freedom in this perspective is defined as: 
“…the progressive enlargement of the rational, means-consequence-perceiving capacity 
of people and of opportunities to choose among alternative ways of organizing structural 
aspects of the political and economic processes.  The exercise of freedom requires the 
development in individuals of self-directive capabilities. To be effective, freedom must be 
grounded in reliable knowledge”. 
 
The emphasis on knowledge as a prerequisite for freedom is particularly important for 
Tool, who argues that for choice to be genuine, it has to be informed and based on 
knowledge: 
“Freedom means both the opportunity to choose among genuine alternatives and ready 
access to knowledge that will function to make the selection an informed one. Choice 
without knowledge is a fraud. Knowledge without choice is sterile. Free societies are those 
which understand this necessary linkage and provide prescriptive and proscriptive 
arrangements… to assure access to knowledge and the right to employ it in guiding 
choice making”. 
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In emphasising this positive, participatory dimension of freedom, Tool sees various 
structural arrangements as means that the political process can hold economic power 
to account. The argument in this paper is that Tool’s concerns for knowledge, 
accountability and communally-shared freedom needs to be extended and applied to 
strategic decision-making within transnational firms, and this requires purposive public 
policy to bring about such a change. 
 
4.  ‘Free’ Markets, Globalisation and Strategic Failure 
This recent re-emphasis on the positive dimensions of freedom, in contrast with the 
mainstream focus on negative freedom and hence Pareto-efficiency, is welcome as the 
latter is not the only view of ‘efficiency’ that could be considered.  Other considerations 
might include to what extent an economic system yields the most appropriate 
outcomes for the society (or societies) served by that economy (Cowling and Sugden 
1994); a concept of social efficiency.  Underpinning this approach, a distinction is 
drawn between ‘corporate’ and ‘community’ strategies. ‘Corporate’ strategies are 
viewed as strategies for development conceived by and in the interests of strategic 
decision-makers within giant firms, whereas ‘community’ development strategies are 
those devised by and in the interests of a wider set of actors in the community (Sugden 
and Wilson, 2002). The implication is that if strategic decision-making is the preserve 
of only a few, there arises the potential for ‘strategic failure’, where the objectives of 
the elite making strategic decisions conflict with wider interests in society, with the 
result that the economic system fails to deliver the most appropriate outcomes for the 
community.  The risks of such strategic failure are seen as more likely when 
deregulation and liberalisation create increased negative freedom from intervention (by 
government, workers and others) for strategic decision-makers in giant firms. 
 
The contemporary global economy can be seen as such a world. Transnationals 
increasingly dominate world trade and investment, being “central actors” in the world 
economy (United Nations, 1997). This is highly evident in that globally, the share of 
inward FDI stocks as a percentage of world GDP has increased from 8.5 percent in 
1990 to 22.7 percent in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2007: 307).  According to UNCTAD 
estimates, in 2005 there were approximately 77,000 transnationals with over 770,000 
foreign affiliates. During 2005, these affiliates earned an estimated $4.5 trillion in value 
added, employed approximately 62 million workers and exported goods and services 
valued at over $4 trillion (UNCTAD 2007: xviii). Intra-firm trade in particular is a crucial 
part of production for transnationals, with evidence suggesting that this accounts for 
over one third of world trade (Dicken, 2006: 53). Within such dominant firms, it is 
widely accepted that elites control decision-making in their own interests (see Kay, 
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1997).4  Cox (1992, in Scholte, 2000) sees power in global markets concentrated in 
the “nébuleuse” or system of elite networking that governs behind the scenes, free 
from public accountability. Current attempts to develop a multinational agreement on 
investment could reinforce the negative freedom of such elite strategic decision-
makers in transnationals.   
 
In accordance with this trend, from UNCTAD (2007: 25), we find that the current thrust 
of regulation has been to favour transnationals: the majority of policy changes (over 80 
percent) on FDI in 2005 across the world resulted in a ‘more favourable’ environment 
for transnationals. Asia has been prominent at liberalising (op.cit. 24), with China 
leading the way. In 2005 for example China removed geographical limits on the 
operations of foreign banks and also “allowed for 100% foreign ownership of hotels as 
well as minority foreign ownership in television programming, distribution and movie 
production” (op.cit. 58). 
 
With globalisation leading to more concentration of economic power and decision-
making in transnational firms, the implications of such an economic and political 
transformation need to be recognised.  The world has thus changed dramatically since 
Berlin set out his ideas, with much greater concentration of economic power and 
decision-making in transnational firms, and much less room available for governments 
to manoeuvre; in what Tool (2001) terms “private ‘governmental’ control through 
multinational nonaccountable corporations”. This dominance of transnational firms is 
seen not just in their control of global investment and trade, but also in their power in 
shaping the global economic environment in their own, negatively free, interests.  
 
Strategic failures resulting from such a dominance of transnational firms and the 
concentration of strategic decision-making in negatively free elites has been explored 
by researchers in a number of contexts: for example deindustrialisation in Japan 
(Bailey and Sugden, 2007); uneven development (Cowling and Sugden, 1999); and the 
divide and rule of workers (see Cowling and Tomlinson, 2006, for a summary). The 
deindustrialisation process experienced in Japan in recent years can be seen as an 
example of strategic failure precisely because policy deliberately concentrated 
strategic decision-making in elites within giant firms (with whom senior civil servants 
had very close contact) which were then able to capture aspects of policy in the pursuit 
of their own strategic goals, notably through prompting a liberalisation of outward 
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investment (increased negative freedom) whilst leaving intact controls over imports 
(Bailey and Sugden, 2007).  This allowed firms to become transnational and shift 
operations to lower cost locations - leading to a hollowing out of manufacturing - whilst 
keeping their home markets protected through import controls, with negative 
consequences for the Japanese economy. Such negatively free strategic decision-
makers in Japan’s vertical keiretsu have searched for ‘competitiveness’ by relocating 
production overseas.  This has impacted severely on the dense networks of small firms 
that have served them. 
 
Whilst Berlin’s point that freedom can be subverted by the concentration of power 
(thereby distorting the concept of positive freedom) remains as valid now as at the time 
of writing, it needs to be recognised that the current, over-riding desire to promote ‘free 
markets’ in reality means negative freedom for a few elite strategic decision-makers in 
transnational firms.  The result is both an undermining of positive freedom for the many 
to contribute to decision-making; and strategic failure.  In other words, we have ‘free’ 
markets in only a limited sense of the word free and need to begin asking for whom 
are they free and in what sense?  Addressing such challenges raises some key issues 
for the design of industrial policy and it is to this that we turn next. 
 
5.  Balance and Diversity of Freedoms: Key Issues for Industrial Policy Design? 
Despite Meade’s (1975) claim that “the great virtue of the competitive market 
mechanism is that it combines efficiency with freedom”, markets increasingly 
concentrate strategic decision-making power (Dugger, 1989).  Appeals to negative 
freedom are the justification for ‘freer’ markets and trade. It means freedom from 
intervention for the elite in dominant transnational firms, with strategic failure the end 
result. At the other end of the spectrum, central planners in state socialist systems 
justified their actions with appeals to positive freedom.  Whilst claiming to be raising 
positive freedom for workers, in reality elites of planners emphasised their own positive 
freedom to control economic decision-making, leading in turn to an erosion of negative 
freedom for the many, as well as to government failure - a particular form of strategic 
failure.
5
  This led to government failure having a number of effects, including: retarded 
technological development; over-centralised control of investment decisions; and more 
systemically the creation of a shortage economy (Kornai, 1980). 
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It appears therefore that over-emphasis at the macro-level
6
 on either single type of 
freedom is likely to lead both to distortions of freedoms and in economic terms to 
strategic failure and social inefficiency. The latter is likely to arise because over-
emphasis on one single type of freedom, whether negative in capitalist economies or 
positive in centrally planned systems, actually means only elites control strategic 
decision-making in their interests and only a few are free. A balance between positive 
and negative freedoms at the macro-level is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, 
requirement to avoid strategic failure. The avoidance of strategic failure also requires 
democratic involvement by communities in strategic decision-making. Communities 
need to be free to contribute to such decision-making.  Hence in addition to macro-
balance, diversity at the micro-level over who has freedoms is also required, for if elites 
solely control strategic decisions this constrains the room for manoeuvre (i.e., freedom) 
for others. The end result is strategic failure as the interest of the elites contrast with 
the interests of others.   
 
Thus when we consider what economic freedom entails, it is really a composite notion, 
comprising various dimensions: what type(s) of freedom are being emphasised; where 
freedom resides within the system (i.e. who is free?); and how those freedoms are 
realised.  In order to expand ‘economic freedom’, various policy responses may be 
seen as appropriate, tackling both the nature of the firm itself as well as the 
environment within which firms make decisions, using both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches, constraining negative freedom for some so as to release or expand 
freedoms for many others. Economic democracy is therefore vital in avoiding strategic 
failure (see Cowling and Sugden, 1998). Here it is vital as a means both to facilitate 
diversity over who has freedoms (addressing the issue of where freedom resides) and 
to facilitate positive freedom via a collective form of self-mastery, as a democratic 
participant in economic decision-making (the what and how dimension). 
 
Mainstream economists will argue that ‘free markets’ have always meant negatively 
free markets. This ignores, however, how the meaning of ‘freedom’ in both political and 
economic terms has changed over the years.  When the terms ‘free trade’ or ‘freedom 
to trade’ first appeared, they did not mean the absence of trade restrictions such as 
tariffs, but rather the alternative to government-granted monopolies over trade and 
medieval controls (Irwin, 1996). Only later did ‘free trade’ come to mean dismantling 
trade restrictions in the sense that we know it today. Furthermore, despite Berlin’s 
concern over the concept of positive freedom being corrupted by transforming it into a 
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collective form, there is a long intellectual tradition emphasising the social dimension of 
positive freedom. As Gray (1995) notes, this “most offensive feature of positive 
freedom, its conflation of individual self-direction with collective self rule” was inherent 
in the ancient Greek view of freedom.; “the ancient or positive sense of freedom was 
that of collective self-rule, and that the negative freedom concept is distinctly modern”.  
How then can collective self-rule be viewed as a later perversion of positive freedom?  
Indeed, Berlin has been criticised for failing to recognise the distinction between self-
mastery and the collective form of self-mastery, involving being a democratic 
participant in decision-making (Macpherson, 1973). The latter is particularly relevant 
here, and is stressed in terms of economic democracy. 
 
It needs to be made explicit, however, that reasserting the freedoms of community 
groups (and in particular their positive freedom) would reduce negative freedoms for 
those few who presently exercise them.  The existence of such freedom trade-offs has 
been recognised in other areas of economic thinking.  In looking at welfare provision, 
for example, Dasgupta (1986) observed that there “may need to be a dilution of some 
forms of negative freedom for the advancement of certain aspects of positive freedom 
and vice versa”.  A trade-off also exists in terms of corporate strategic decision-
making, with the justification for more of a balance of freedoms, and diversity over who 
has freedom, being that this is not a negative sum game; if a balance can be achieved, 
the outcome is positive, in the form of avoiding strategic failure. 
 
Of course, in extending strategic decision-making, it needs to be recognised that social 
agreements cannot be reached “harmoniously”, on which Berlin was so critical. There 
will always be conflict in any society, but in a world of negatively-free strategic decision 
making, opposition can be overcome by strategic decision-makers (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1998).  Rather, if expanded freedoms for others are seen as important (which 
we argue is, as a way of avoiding strategic failure), we have to find ways of informing 
them, giving voice to them, and listening to them.  In this context, there is a need to 
design institutional arrangements that assist in building consensus in a ‘bottom-up’ 
way, in taking into account different viewpoints, so as to empower communities and 
enhance their positive freedom.     
 
6.  Towards a ‘Democratic Globalisation’ via Expanded Positive Freedom: A Role 
for Industrial Policy 
Despite much criticism of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Stiglitz, 2002) and of attempts 
to remove restrictions on investment flows without any concomitant increase in 
responsibilities for transnationals, in reality little has changed in terms of the process of 
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globalisation driving towards greater deregulation and more freedom from control for 
strategic decision-makers within such firms. Recognising the reality of a global 
economy where negatively free transnationals are central actors, an appropriate first 
step in an industrial policy aiming to inject positive freedom would be a strategy of 
monitoring transnationals (Bailey et al, 1998, 2000).  Accountability and its links with 
freedom can be seen as a two-stage process, with “freedom of information” provision 
in the short-term, leading on to the ability for communities to act on that information in 
the longer-term.
7
   
 
Monitoring transnationals is therefore a necessary but not sufficient requirement for 
positive freedom for communities, in providing the information to turn an entitlement to 
contribute into a capability to act. Government-created, yet independent, monitoring 
units might investigate the impact of transnationals on economies, and in doing so 
could network with other community monitoring-bodies. Monitoring transnational firms 
would aim to provide an openness and accountability that would facilitate a dialogue 
and debate, ensuring that markets under globalisation would more likely operate in an 
open and equitable manner, and for a wider variety of interest groups.  This could 
effectively address Tool’s (2001) concern over knowledge as a requirement for 
effective freedom, in this sense in terms of making transnationals accountable and 
providing community groups with the information they need to contribute effectively to 
decision-making. 
 
At the supra-national level, the case for a European monitoring approach as a first step 
in countering the power of transnationals has been detailed by Bailey et al (1998). In 
other regions of the world such as Africa, where respective supra-national authorities 
might not have the clout to pursue monitoring of transnationals; then a greater role 
(and or/reform) for international bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO 
would be called for.   
 
Furthermore, it has to be recognised that deregulation alone and its inherent over-
emphasis on negative freedom for elite corporate decision-makers can lead to 
strategic failure, and is thus not cost-free; as the Japanese experience demonstrates 
(Bailey and Sugden, 2007). Moreover, such experiences suggest a need to deregulate 
gradually and carefully (if at all) so as to avoid a concentration of strategic decision-
making and combine it with measures to promote decentralised decision-making. The 
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latter measures might include: (i) reforms to corporate governance so as to shift away 
from top-down patterns of development and to provide community groups with an input 
into strategic decision-making; (ii) fostering alternative forms of internationalisation via 
‘multilateral webs’ of small firms; (iii) linking further moves towards global deregulation 
with greater accountability.   
 
The first issue, governance, is crucial in enabling participation by a wider set of actors 
in strategic decision-making. This is itself related to the concept of knowledge. If 
knowledge is essential to effective freedom, as Tool (2001) argues, it needs to be 
recognised that “knowledge” is not merely the provision of facts, but also needs to be 
seen as “active and dynamic”, where good governance necessitates that each 
interested person be able to access and use knowledge in participating fully in the 
governance process. This depends on factors such as education and information, but 
moreover on participation itself as “a learning process that generates further 
knowledge” (ibid).
8
 This in turn links back to Sen’s (1999) definition of substantive 
freedom as comprising a positive, participatory dimension, with participation seen as 
an end in itself - and not merely a means to an end - in terms of development.  
 
We might thus envisage a virtuous circle of development, with cumulative linkages 
between knowledge and freedom, freedom and participation, and participation and 
knowledge. Fostering more effective and participatory governance would require policy 
intervention to change corporate governance arrangements and law in order to shift 
away from elites controlling strategic decision-making. This is explored by Branston et 
al (2006) in the context of the strategic choice perspective, who advocate the reform of 
corporate law, a role for democratically controlled public agencies to monitor firms’ 
strategies and to secure effective representation of the public interest when firms make 
strategic decisions, as well as the nurturing of a civic society where people appreciate 
the importance of participation. They recognise that broadening the membership of 
strategic decision-makers beyond shareholders would need to be “developed and 
evolved over time”, and that it would be infeasible to attempt to provide all interests 
with an appropriate voice simultaneously (ibid). 
 
Exactly what constitutes this broader set of stakeholders remains something of a 
‘loose-end’ in the discussion on strategic decision-making, however.  One way forward 
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might be to consider how negatively-free strategic decision-making for elites cuts 
across the freedoms of other groups, for example in the sense of what room for 
manoeuvre others then have to make decisions. Such an approach, focusing on 
expanding the area of genuine choice in Tool’s analysis (1979, 2001), would suggest 
that such community groups could differ according to the type of strategic decision 
being made.  In some cases it might just affect the freedoms of groups of workers, in 
other cases workers and suppliers, and so on. This might mean a flexible definition of 
the firm itself, with variable community groupings playing a role in different areas of 
strategic decision-making, with coordinating mechanisms across strategic decisions. 
The key point here is that as soon as we move away from considering only negative 
freedoms, a range of possibilities open up in terms of corporate governance 
arrangements, with implications for economic democracy, and all within what can 
genuinely be considered as ‘free markets’. Micro-diversity over how freedoms are 
realised might thus come through encouraging ‘econo-diversity’; the emergence of 
different corporate forms, with different governance structures facilitating community 
participation via various mechanisms. Such ‘econo-diversity’ could also provide an 
effective counterweight to corporate hegemony (see Dugger, 1989). 
 
There are signs that some aspects of the reform agenda we outline are already evident 
in some countries – Germany, for example, has traditionally had a system of 
supervisory boards in companies, whereby employee representatives enjoy rights of 
co-determination with management (Gill and Krieger, 2000). Moreover, the EU has an 
explicit agenda to promote worker participation; as evidenced through the operation of 
European Works Councils (Marginson et al., 2004) and more recently with the passage 
of the Information and Consultation Directive, designed to facilitate national systems of 
information provision and consultation with workers in member countries (Hall, 2005). 
Whilst it might be argued that such bodies could be prone to capture by a corporate 
agenda, they at least represent attempts to provide voice beyond that of a narrow 
group of elite transnational decision-makers. The case of Network Rail in the UK 
provides another good example of how strategic failure (and consequent poor 
performance) can lead to a change in governance structures. Here the UK 
Government restructured the organisation away from a shareholder-based 
organisation to one run by 114 appointed members of the public, including passenger 
authorities and representatives from disabled-access groups who are to ensure “high 
standards of corporate governance” (Branston et al., 2006: 199).  
 
Such moves could be enhanced by growing a more diffuse system of entrepreneurship 
that fuses the public and private, and avoids the risk of strategic failure. Crucially, this 
 14 
would require policymakers moving beyond the Porterian view of ‘clusters’ - which has 
been both superficial in its analysis and confused in its policy-relevance (Martin and 
Sunley, 2003) - towards a more sophisticated understanding of relationships within and 
across different ‘clusters’, focusing on the governance structures required in order to 
avoid ‘top down’ concentrated strategic decision-making and strategic failure. Building 
webs of small firms, where strategic decision-making is more diffuse, should be a 
focus for industrial policy, initially by encouraging existing local production systems to 
look outwards to other systems, and then to build multi-locality webs underpinned by 
mental proximity
9
. Multi-locality webs are seen as a potential alternative to the top-
down control of giant firms, and would be large-scale production processes comprising 
a myriad of smaller firms in a nexus of criss-crossing relationships which span borders 
– i.e., a multi-local (rather than a transnational-controlled) production processes. As 
Cowling and Sugden (1999) note, the characteristics of webs also include democracy 
in strategic decision-making and a balance of (positive and negative) freedoms across 
participant actors.  
 
Policy lessons might be learned from experience elsewhere; in order to compete 
internationally without the economies of scale that transnationals enjoy, firms in certain 
industrial Italian districts have cooperated in the collective provision of marketing and 
other services. Such cooperation amongst enterprises could be encouraged and 
enhanced through the provision of support structures and quasi-public goods to webs 
of small firms.
10
 These could include specialist services and R&D support, for example 
via more innovative university-web-community relationships. The latter would have to 
be underpinned by a re-appraisal of the role of universities and a shift away from 
corporatisation of higher education towards conceptualising universities as providing a 
counterpoint to corporate hegemony. This would require a new sort of university, 
integrated in the industrial economy, based in the locality, but looking out, developing a 
multi-national base. Similarly, the finance system would need to be shifted towards a 
more decentralised form with the dominant objective of supporting webs of small firms 
rather than giant capital (see Bailey and Cowling, 2006).    
 
Developing knowledge, accountability and participation via the monitoring of 
transnationals, reforming corporate law and governance and the building of webs of 
smaller firms could be enhanced by limits on negatively free trade where transnationals 
                                            
9
 Mental proximity “constitutes the basis for and lowers the barriers for building person-to-
person trust, such as shared values and beliefs” (Roos et al., 2005: 26).  
 
10
 The role of ‘social firms’ could also be important in this regard (see Harding and Cowling, 
2004). 
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engage in socially damaging behaviour (Cowling and Sugden, 1998), and the linking of 
further moves towards deregulation (i.e., granting elite decision-makers more negative 
freedom) with greater responsibilities in terms of information disclosure and 
accountability (Bailey et al, 2000; McClintock, 1999).  Taken together, such measures 
could expand the positive freedom of communities and reduce the risks of strategic 
failure under globalisation. 
 
7.  Concluding Comments 
This paper has linked radical institutionalist and strategic choice literatures so as to 
better understand freedom, accountability and participation in the context of a 
globalising economic system dominated by transnational corporations. The paper 
suggests that freedom can be seen as a composite notion, with various dimensions to 
consider. It is not solely an issue of trading-off negative and positive freedom, although 
it is argued that such trade-offs do exist over strategic decision-making in transnational 
firms. Rather, when we consider what is meant by freedom, various dimensions exist, 
including: what type(s) of freedom - negative and/or positive - are being emphasised; 
where freedom resides within the system (i.e. who is free); and how those freedoms 
are realised. The avoidance of strategic failure requires all three dimensions to be 
addressed.   
 
These dimensions of freedom raise a number of issues that need to be borne in mind 
by policy-makers if globalisation is to work for a wider set of actors.  The first concerns 
macro-balance, so as to avoid elites controlling decision making; and the second 
micro-diversity, in terms of where and how freedoms are realised.  Macro-balance is 
critical as over-reliance on either single type of freedom leads to strategic failure. In 
state socialist systems, an emphasis on positive freedom meant freedom for elite 
planners to control. This eroded negative freedom for the many (the economic 
dimension of Berlin’s argument on distortion of freedom) and led to government failure 
as a specific form of strategic failure.  In globalising market economies, negatively free 
markets confer ever-increasing power on elites of decision-makers in increasingly 
dominant transnational firms.  The end result of ever more concentrated, negatively 
free decision-making is again strategic failure, with a failure of the system to produce 
outcomes most suitable for the communities served by that economic system.  Such 
‘free’ markets are free in only a limited sense of the word.  In order to avoid 
globalisation serving only a narrow set of interests (those of elites), markets need to be 
reconstructed in a manner that pays attention to both types of freedom.   
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The second issue, micro-diversity embraces two dimensions; where and how.  ‘Where’ 
freedom occurs raises the question; is it solely elites of strategic decision makers, or 
are community groups free to contribute to decision-making?  A key concern here is 
the collective form of positive freedom, of the ability to contribute as a participant in 
economic-democratic processes.  On how such freedoms can be realised, there is also 
no single way of giving communities the capability to make plans and decisions; 
various methods of releasing this positive freedom may be feasible. 
 
Given the present starting point of negatively free markets, the goals of balance and 
diversity involve reasserting the positive freedom of communities.  It would involve a 
trade-off; a loss of negative-freedom for elite decision makers, as they would no longer 
be free from control, from intervention.  The end result would be free markets, but in a 
very different sense as such markets would emphasise different dimensions of 
freedom and would ameliorate the risks of strategic failure.  This has resonance for the 
’bottom-up versus top-down’ debate in industrial policy design.  Policy intervention in 
this sense would be both ‘top-down’ in curtailing the negative freedom of corporate 
strategic decision makers, and ‘bottom-up’ in promoting the freedoms (both negative 
and particularly positive) of communities by enabling them to participate in strategic 
decision-making.  The irony is that broadening the participation of communities in 
strategic decision-making and the process of globalisation (towards a democratic 
globalisation) can be justified not by appealing to socialism, but rather by a desire to 
create genuinely free markets, free in both a positive as well as a negative sense of 
the word. 
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